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Sammendrag:. 
  Rapporten peker på de viktigste hindrene for USAs 
deltakelse i internasjonale klimaavtaler, og foreslår 
noen mulige strategier for å engasjere landet i 
klimasamarbeidet. Første del av rapporten gir en 
oversikt over den politiske prosessen i USA fram til i 
dag. 
Andre del beskriver de fire viktigste hindrene for 
amerikansk deltakelse i bindende internasjonale 
avtaler om å bekjempe menneskeskapte 
klimaendringer. Tredje del foreslår noen elementer til 
en strategi for hvordan myndighetene i europeiske 
land kan forholde seg til USA i klimapolitikken. 
 
Abstract:  
The report identifies the major obstacles to U.S. 
participation in an international treaty to control 
greenhouse gas emissions, and suggests some possible 
strategies for reengaging the United States. It proceeds 
as follows: Section one outlines the U.S. climate 
policy process up to the present. Section two describes 
four major barriers to U.S. participation in binding 
international agreements to mitigate anthropogenic 
climate change. Section three proposes some elements 
of a short-term strategy for European governments in 
dealing with the United States in the field of climate 
policy. 
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Executive summary 
With responsibility for a quarter of the world’s CO2 emissions, and a persistent concern about the costs 
of any form of regulation of these emissions, the United States is a key player in international climate 
policy. The United States will not ratify the Kyoto Protocol, and the George W. Bush administration is 
not likely to play a constructive role in negotiations on new commitments under the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). However, in a few years Congress may 
possibly adopt some form of national regulation of greenhouse gases, with modest but mandatory 
targets. From 2009, the United States may have a president with a different climate policy agenda. 
Meanwhile, several U.S. states plan to adopt substantial climate policies.  
The report identifies four key barriers to U.S. reengagement in international cooperation on 
regulating greenhouse gas emissions: First, the President and the majority in Congress do not believe 
the climate problem is sufficiently serious to merit mandatory emissions regulations. Second, there is a 
strong concern about the costs of regulation and the uncertainty about those costs. Third, concern 
about competition from developing countries and consequent loss of manufacturing jobs makes 
binding commitments for the United States without parallel commitments for developing countries 
controversial domestically. Fourth, the U.S. political system means that adopting any climate policy at 
the federal level is likely to be a difficult and time-consuming process, and in particular that 
negotiating partners face a substantial risk that any binding international agreement negotiated by the 
executive branch will not be ratified by the necessary 2/3 majority in the Senate. The first obstacle 
may eventually be overcome through information, arguments or simply through elections bringing 
candidates with different views into office. The three other barriers should be seen as given constraints 
on policy.  
The United States’ unwillingness to adopt binding commitments poses difficult challenges for 
European governments seeking to promote international cooperation in this field. In devising a climate 
policy strategy for the next few years, European governments seeking to extend and improve the 
climate regime must meet the following six challenges:  
First, they need to ensure a successful implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, including well-
functioning systems for emissions trading. This would serve as an example and argument for U.S. 
proponents of similar regulations. Second, in conjunction with other Kyoto Protocol parties, they 
should move ahead with talks on the issue of a second commitment period to follow the first period 
2008-2012, even in the absence of constructive U.S. government participation. Postponing 
negotiations until the United States might reengage would create further uncertainty about the future 
of the regulatory system now being set up, which could damage its credibility and effectiveness. Third, 
European governments should help raise the profile of the climate change issue on the domestic U.S. 
agenda by the means available to them. Fourth, they must maintain a dialogue between the Kyoto 
parties and those actors within the United States who are developing key climate policy initiatives in 
Congress and at the state level. Ensuring compatibility of emissions trading systems being set up in 
different parts of the world is a key concern. Converging principles and standards could be the first 
step towards eventually linking the separate trading systems. Fifth, Europeans should consider in 
which climate-relevant fields other than actual emissions regulation they might usefully cooperate 
with the Americans on the short term, notably science and technology. A pledge to match any U.S. 
increase in spending on climate-relevant R&D or technology transfer might be one way to coordinate 
action while bypassing formal negotiations. Sixth, European governments should reconsider their 
vision of the future international climate regime and how the United States might eventually reengage. 
Alternatives to the Kyoto Protocol architecture should be carefully considered with an eye to future 
reengagement of the United States. And for several reasons it might be better both for the United 
States and its negotiating partners if the United States developed a modest but credible domestic 
policy to control greenhouse gas emissions before it negotiates binding international commitments.  
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1 Introduction: An outline of the US climate policy process 
By any measure, the United States is a key player in international climate policy. It is 
responsible for nearly a quarter of the world’s primary energy consumption and a similar 
share of CO2 emissions from fossil fuels. Among the major economies, it has the highest CO2 
emissions per capita.1 These simple facts explain why the rest of the world has a keen interest 
in U.S. climate policy. Concern is reinforced by the upward trend in emissions. Total U.S. 
greenhouse gas emissions grew by about 12 percent from 1990 to 1999, and are projected to 
keep growing by a similar rate over the next two decades (U.S. Department of State 2002). 
These trends have also helped make climate policy a controversial and divisive issue within 
the United States. 
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Figure 1. CO2 emissions per capita 
1.1  U.S. climate policy before 2001 
Since the beginning of the climate change negotiations, the United States has been 
particularly concerned with the costs of climate policy (Schreurs 2004). Under President 
George H. W. Bush, U.S. opposition prevented any binding targets for emissions reductions 
from being set in the Climate Convention (UNFCCC), which was finalized in 1992 at the 
UNCED conference in Rio. However, the United States was among the first countries to sign 
the Convention.  
The Clinton administration sought a more ambitious climate policy, but was unable to get 
an important energy tax proposal passed into law by Congress. Since then, domestic climate 
policy has been limited to a modest set of energy efficiency standards, tax incentives, and 
voluntary measures for the private sector. In the UNFCCC process, U.S. negotiators kept 
                                                     
1 IEA International Energy Annual 2002: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/iea/carbon.html
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stressing the need to keep any agreement cost-effective. Several aspects of the UNFCCC and 
the Kyoto Protocol of 1997 bear evidence of the U.S. concern about cost (Agrawala and 
Andresen 2001:123). These include the “comprehensive approach” embracing a wide range 
of gases, sources and sinks, and the principle of flexible implementation, allowing countries 
to trade emissions permits and credits across borders. On the other hand, the United States 
accepted a target of 7 percent reduction in 2008-2012 relative to 1990. In light of emissions 
trends since 1990, this looked more demanding than the 8 percent target for the EU countries. 
All the while, the Clinton administration was squeezed between foreign governments on one 
side and Congress and U.S. business lobbies on the other. The industry-backed Global 
Climate Coalition and other anti-regulation interests ran major ad and lobbying campaigns 
claiming both that the scientific basis for expecting climate change was unsound, and that the 
cost of regulation was prohibitive (McCright and Dunlap 2000; McCright and Dunlap 2003).  
The 1995 Berlin Mandate for the negotiations that eventually led to the Kyoto Protocol 
explicitly exempted developing countries from any new commitments. The rationale was the 
developed countries’ historical responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions, their currently 
high per capita emissions, and their superior financial and technological capacity for 
mitigation. The Clinton administration’s consent to this mandate raised strong objections in 
Congress and industry. One consequence was the Byrd-Hagel “sense of the Senate” 
resolution, passed unanimously a few months before the 1997 Kyoto conference, stating that 
the United States should not be a signatory to any protocol which would “mandate new 
commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for the [developed] Annex I 
Parties, unless the protocol or other agreement also mandates new specific scheduled 
commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for Developing Country Parties 
within the same compliance period” (U.S. Senate 1997). The resolution declared that an 
agreement that did not fulfill this demand would not be ratified by the Senate.  
The Byrd-Hagel resolution was important because any international treaty must be ratified 
by the Senate with a 2/3 majority for the United States to be bound by it. Supporters of 
international cooperation on climate change in Congress and the White House preferred a 
unanimous resolution to losing the vote by a large margin. However, the resolution placed 
them in a difficult situation. The developing countries were determined to defend the 
concession they had gained in Berlin. It seemed that the negotiations had reached an impasse, 
with the United States and the developing countries insisting that the other party move first. 
The Clinton administration’s strategy was to accept the Kyoto Protocol without developing 
country targets, and to seek what the President called “meaningful participation from key 
developing countries” in more creative ways. This included voluntary commitments from 
developing countries which would allow them to take part in emissions trading. U.S. 
diplomatic efforts following the Kyoto conference gave modest results, even if Argentina and 
Kazakstan did volunteer to adopt targets (Barros and Grand 2002; Aldy 2004). It was fairly 
obvious that the Senate’s criterion for ratification was not met, and the Clinton administration 
never submitted the Kyoto Protocol to the Senate for ratification. 
The other main condition imposed by the Byrd-Hagel resolution was that the protocol 
should not “result in serious harm to the economy of the United States” (U.S. Senate 1997). In 
the domestic debate on costs of implementing the Protocol following the Kyoto conference, 
assumptions about developing country participation again turned out to be a critical issue. 
Assuming that developing countries would participate in emissions trading radically reduced 
projected compliance costs for the United States because of ample opportunities to cut 
emissions cheaply in those countries (Weyant 1999). The Clinton administration’s economic 
assessments assumed broad developing country participation in trading which was in line 
with the administration’s policy but not with prevailing international realities (Aldy 2004).  
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1.2 Climate policy under George W. Bush 
Developing country participation was also emphasized during the first months of the George 
W. Bush administration. When definitely closing the door on US ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol, President Bush stated, “I oppose the Kyoto Protocol because it exempts 80 percent 
of the world, including major population centers such as China and India, from compliance, 
and would cause serious harm to the U.S. economy” (U.S. White House 2001). While Bush 
drew criticism for his blunt rejection, Democratic leaders have generally argued for 
reengagement and renegotiation rather than ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. In recent 
UNFCCC meetings, the Bush administration has sided with most of the developing countries 
in opposing calls from the EU, Japan, Norway and others to open talks on new commitments 
to follow or supplement the Kyoto targets.  
In addition to rejecting the Kyoto Protocol, the newly elected President George W. Bush 
also turned away from a campaign promise to regulate CO2 from power plants as a pollutant. 
Partly in response to criticism of these decisions, his administration has sought to outline an 
alternative to the Kyoto approach to climate change. This alternative has three major 
components:  
• An emissions target defined relative to GDP,  
• Voluntary measures to implement the target, and  
• Research, development and demonstration efforts to introduce new energy 
technologies that may reduce emissions in the future.  
The Global Climate Change Initiatives announced by President George W. Bush on 
February 14, 2002, commits the United States to “reduce the greenhouse gas intensity of the 
U.S. economy by 18 percent over the next ten years” (U.S. White House 2002). Critics have 
noted that this target amounts to little more than extending the trend in greenhouse gas 
intensity (emissions per dollar of GDP) reduction from the previous decade, and that it means 
allowing actual emissions to rise substantially over the coming years (Menz 2002). The 
implementation of the target depends on voluntary measures. In February 2002, the President 
challenged businesses to “make specific commitments to improving the greenhouse gas 
intensity of their operations and to reduce emissions.” This initiative has been followed up by 
a series of agreements and declarations from business associations representing major, 
energy-intensive industrial sectors, which promises to seek to reduce the emissions intensity 
of their operations (U.S. EPA 2003). The quantified targets of most of these voluntary 
commitments are, however, even more modest than the overall national goal defined by the 
administration. This is hardly surprising. In the absence of a credible threat of mandatory 
controls in case of non-compliance, there are weak incentives for industry to effectively 
implement “voluntary” emissions reductions (Torvanger and Skodvin 2002). 
The one area of climate policy where the Bush administration has introduced substantial 
new policies and funding is energy technology research, development and demonstration. The 
Bush administration has increased funding for research, development and demonstration of 
hydrogen as well as carbon capture and storage technologies. It has announced long-term 
projects and public-private partnerships including the FutureGen plant, which is expected to 
produce electricity and hydrogen from coal without CO2 emissions, the FreedomCAR project 
to develop hydrogen-powered cars, and the parallel Hydrogen Fuel Initiative.  
During 2003 and 2004, three new multilateral agreements on climate technology 
cooperation saw the light of day: the Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum (CSLF), the 
International Partnership for the Hydrogen Economy (IPHE), and the recently launched 
Methane to Markets Partnership (MMP) that will promote the collection of methane from 
landfills, coal mines and petroleum activity to use it as an energy source. All three 
collaborations seem initially to have been U.S. initiatives (U.S. Department of State 2003; 
U.S. White House 2003; U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2004). The U.S. Department 
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of Energy hosts the secretariats of CSLF and IPHE. In the most recent initiative, MMP, the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency plays a leading role.2 All three agreements are non-
binding and do not impose financial or other commitments on the signatories. Objectives 
include the identification and facilitation of collaborative efforts.  
In Congress, there is considerable support for legislation that would regulate U.S. 
greenhouse gas emissions, but no majority. The most prominent initiative is the Lieberman-
McCain Climate Stewardship Act, which was introduced in the Senate and rejected by a 55-
43 majority in October 2003. While most of the supporters were Democrats, a number of 
Democrats also defected and voted against the proposal, while some Republicans voted in 
favor, including co-sponsor John McCain. Senators from major coal-producing states were 
much more likely to have voted against the bill, (Fisher 2004). This was the first time the 
Senate voted on legislation that would place binding constraints on greenhouse gas emissions. 
The proposal would have capped total 2010 emissions at the 2000 level for the sectors 
covered by the legislation, and would have allowed trading of permits and credits. The sectors 
covered represent some 85% of total US GHG emissions.3  
Similar legislation has been introduced in the House of Representatives, but commands 
considerably less support there. Both houses of Congress have to agree in order to pass a bill 
into law.  
Meanwhile, the most important developments in U.S. climate policy are taking place at the 
state and regional levels. Several states have already passed legislation to control greenhouse 
emissions. For instance, Massachusetts and New Hampshire have introduced CO2 limits for 
power plants. More and more states are also introducing renewable portfolio standard laws, 
which require electric utilities to sell a certain share of renewable energy. Most recently, such 
a law won the support of Colorado’s voters in a ballot initiative on November 2, 2004.4  
The important Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative was first proposed by New York 
Governor George E. Pataki in 2003. Nine Northeastern states are currently working on a 
regional cap-and-trade system for power plants. They plan to present a program design 
proposal by April 2005. In parallel, the governors of the New England states are working with 
their counterparts, the premiers of the Eastern Canadian provinces, under a 2001 agreement 
that aims to reduce regional emissions to the 1990 level by 2010. Cooperation on emission 
registries and policies could potentially evolve into a cross-border trading system.  
Finally, California is introducing regulation that requires producers of cars and trucks to 
sell vehicles that meet far more stringent emissions standards. In September 2004, the 
California Air Resources Board approved rules which will require the companies to sell low-
emissions vehicles from 2009. Compared to today, the rules are expected to reduce the 
average greenhouse gas emissions per kilometer from new vehicles by about 22 percent in 
2012 and about 30 percent in 2016. The states of New York, Massachusetts, New Jersey, 
Vermont, Connecticut, Rhode Island and Maine, as well as the nation of Canada, are expected 
to consider adopting similar regulations. The rule is virtually certain to be challenged in the 
courts, and the outcome will most likely decide its fate. A key issue is whether these rules, 
which in practice will require reduced fuel consumption, are really fuel efficiency standards 
(which are a federal prerogative) or if they are properly in the realm of air pollution where 
California is allowed to make its own standards.   
2 See the following web pages: www.cslforum.org, http://www.iphe.net/ og 
www.epa.gov/methanetomarkets
3 http://www.pewclimate.org/policy_center/analyses/s_139_summary.cfm
4 See Menz (2004) for more on green electricity policies in the U.S. 
Menz, F. C. (2004). Green Electricity Market Development in the United States: Policy Analysis and 
Case Studies, CICERO. 2004. http://www.cicero.uio.no/media/2639.pdf.   
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In the private sector, two important developments are the fragmentation of the earlier 
united business opposition against greenhouse gas regulations, and the emergence of 
voluntary targets and trading systems. The dismantling of the powerful anti-regulation lobby 
group Global Climate Coalition came about not only because of its success in achieving its 
goals under the Bush administration, but also because of changes in the positions of some 
companies. Several major companies in emissions-intensive sectors have partnered with the 
Pew Center on Global Climate Change and adopted voluntary emissions targets. The private 
Chicago Climate Exchange even offers trading in emissions reduction credits. These 
developments will not amount to a solution, but may help the proponents of regulation.   
After the heated Bush/Kerry race, a brief excursion into counterfactual speculation may add 
some useful perspective to the assessment of U.S. climate policy. The visibility and drama of 
presidential elections tends to exaggerate the consequences, which are in fact tempered by the 
limited room for maneuver an incoming president often faces. The Clinton administration 
favored both the Kyoto Protocol and domestic regulations including a special energy tax, but 
the conservative Republican Congress ensured that the final policy outcomes were not much 
different from what happened earlier under President George H. W. Bush and later under 
President George W. Bush. The Clinton administration’s most tangible results in climate 
policy were a number of tax credit arrangements and voluntary programs that were largely 
kept in place under George W. Bush (Brewer 2004). The immediate result of a Kerry victory 
in the elections would most likely have been a return to a situation similar to the Clinton 
years: A relatively ambitious administration with little room for action. 
1.3 Why do Europe and the US see climate change so differently? 
European governments see climate change differently than their U.S. counterpart. The 
transatlantic divide on climate policy has been explained by different costs, different values, 
different political systems and historical contingencies. The latter two are perhaps the most 
convincing explanations.  
Economic analyses suggest that if the United States had ratified the Kyoto Protocol, it 
would have faced somewhat higher costs of compliance, measured as share of GDP, than the 
European Union (Weyant 1999; Metz et al. 2001; Busby and Ochs 2004). However, the 
difference in cost estimates between the United States and the EU using any given set of 
assumptions about the world economy and the implementation of the Protocol is in most 
cases much smaller than the range of estimates for either of the two separately. The projected 
gap between the Kyoto targets and expected 2010 emissions given “business as usual” is 
much larger in the United States. This is largely due to faster growth in the U.S. economy and 
falling emissions in the UK and Germany during the 1990s. On the other hand, most models 
suggest that marginal abatement costs (the cost of reducing emissions by one ton) is lower in 
the United States. On their own, differences in cost do not seem to explain the difference in 
overall approach to climate policy (Busby and Ochs 2004).  
It also seems that divergence in deep-seated values toward environmental issues does not 
explain this difference. The level of concern about climate change among the public at large 
does not vary sufficiently to explain the differences between the United States and Europe by 
itself (Brewer 2003; Busby and Ochs 2004). However, variations in political culture and 
attitudes may go some way in explaining the transatlantic climate policy divide. Opinion polls 
do suggest that the American public is more concerned about the costs of regulation. A 
harsher opposition in general to taxes and government regulation in U.S. politics and public 
opinion may have influenced outcomes. Public debate and the policy process in the United 
States seem to have been more focused on potential costs of regulation from an early point. 
Since the beginning of the climate change negotiations, the United States has stressed the 
need to keep mitigation costs down, while the EU in particular has stressed the precautionary 
principle and the risks of inaction (Schreurs 2004). On the home front, formal cost-benefit 
analysis has played a larger role in U.S. debates on climate policy than on the other side of the 
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Atlantic (Aldy 2004; Schreurs 2004). Meanwhile, the long-standing European skepticism to 
emissions trading has been ironically reversed by the EU’s pioneering CO2 trading scheme 
that will take effect from 2005; the skepticism that may have looked like evidence of a deep-
seated and persistent difference in political culture now seems to be simply a result of a lag in 
learning and experience with that particular instrument (Christiansen and Wettestad 2003).  
Perhaps most convincingly, the difference in approaches to climate policy has been 
attributed to the way the European and U.S. political systems allow environmental and 
industrial interests to be represented. While both the United States and major European 
countries have fairly strong environmental movements that are up against industry lobbies 
with superior financial and bargaining resources, the opportunities for exerting influence are 
different. Important determinants include the role Green parties (and like-minded left and 
centre parties in countries such as Denmark and Norway) have been able to play in Europe 
due to proportional representation and coalition governments. Moreover, the much greater 
importance of private campaign funding in the United States gives business lobbies a crucial 
advantage (Busby and Ochs 2004).  
Historical contingencies have also played a role: The enlisting of the Conservative Kohl 
and Thatcher governments to the climate protection cause at a juncture when their domestic 
emissions were falling helps explain the lower level of partisan conflict over the climate 
change issue in European countries. Similarly, the prevalence of center-left coalitions that 
included relatively uncompromising Green parties in European countries at the time of the 
2000 Hague conference (COP6) helps explain why the U.S.–European conflict was cemented. 
Its timing just before the U.S. presidential elections helped make the U.S. position inflexible 
(Lisowski 2003; Busby and Ochs 2004).  
2 Barriers against U.S. participation 
Based on experience from the U.S. climate policy process up to the present, it is possible to 
identify four major barriers to U.S. participation in a binding international agreement to 
control greenhouse gases. The first one – the fact that neither the President nor the majority in 
Congress see climate change as a sufficiently serious threat to merit any kind of binding 
regulation – is a reality that is difficult to influence from abroad, but which may possibly 
change in a few years.  
The three others – concern about the costs of compliance, concern about competition from 
developing countries, and the risk of delays and policy gridlock inherent in the U.S. political 
system – may be expected to remain enduring traits of U.S. climate policy that future 
international initiatives meant to include the United States will have to take into account.  
2.1  Decision-makers’ views of the climate change problem 
The key barrier to a more ambitious climate policy in the United States is the fact that neither 
the Congressional majority nor the current president believes the problem is sufficiently 
serious to merit mandatory emissions regulations. This does not reflect the view of the 
American public, which according to opinion polls shows a considerable degree of concern 
and is mostly supportive of mandatory greenhouse gas controls. Actually, the “level of U.S. 
public concern is nearly as high as it is among European publics” (Brewer 2003). In other 
words, the low level of ambition in U.S. climate policy seems to have come about despite, not 
because of, public opinion.  
The barrier posed by the low level of concern among the political elite may be overcome in 
three ways. One way is through elections. While there are diverging views in both parties, 
Democratic leaders have generally seen the problem as much more serious than their 
Republican counterparts, and have consequently supported greenhouse gas regulation. The 
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Republican victory in the 2004 elections means that the opponents of regulation strengthened 
their hand slightly in Congress. The first junctures for possible change through elections are 
the mid-term Congress elections in 2006 and the 2008 elections for president and Congress.  
A second way around the barrier is through arguments and evidence. If those in office 
come to see the problem as more serious than before (or public concern with it more 
pressing), the outlook for U.S. climate policy might change. One interesting development is 
the Bush administration’s fairly recent expressions of confidence in the conclusion that 
anthropogenic emissions are in fact warming the atmosphere (Revkin 2004). However, a 
major shift in attitude from the first to the second George W. Bush administration seems 
unlikely barring dramatic events giving overwhelming evidence or illustration of the urgency 
of the climate change problem. Change of opinion among members of Congress is more 
likely to be of importance over the next four years, but will probably not be sufficient by itself 
to secure a majority for greenhouse gas controls.  
The third way around the obstacle is to make the solutions more politically palatable to the 
current administration. If the potential solutions seem less threatening to the economic 
interests of influential actors, the will to accept the problem as serious will most likely 
increase. The issues of costs will be covered in the next section.  
2.2 Cost of compliance 
The cost of compliance has been, and will remain, a key concern for the United States with 
any climate policy commitment. Cost issues dominated the Kyoto debate, in the shape of 
formal economic analyses of aggregate cost as well as claims about specific consequences, 
including increased consumer prices and loss of jobs. In addition to expected costs, 
uncertainty about cost is important, because it could imply a risk of unacceptably high costs.  
While costs are important for any country in deciding whether or not to accept 
environmental commitments, it seems that the U.S. debate has been particularly focused on 
cost issues from an early stage on. Note, however, that the general concern with cost does not 
mean that U.S. policy makers generally think like professional economists (Lutter and 
Shogren 2004). While much emphasis has been placed on analyses of the costs of regulation, 
there has been much less interest in quantifying its economic benefits and actually comparing 
costs and benefits (Bang 2003). Given a wish to limit emissions, maximizing cost-
effectiveness is not necessarily the most important concern for policy makers, as evidenced in 
e.g. their observed preference for fuel economy standards over fuel taxes (Victor 2004). It is 
also important to stress that claims about high costs for society may have consequences even 
when they are not well founded, if backed by actors able to spend large resources on 
presenting them.  
U.S. proponents of greenhouse gas controls have suggested two ways around the cost 
barrier. The first way focuses on ensuring acceptable aggregate costs by means of policy 
instrument design – and by setting less ambitious targets. There seems to be a wide-spread 
consensus among American economists and climate policy analysts that the U.S. Kyoto target 
was too ambitious in the short term, and that the cost-reducing flexibility built into the Kyoto 
Protocol may need to be supplemented with further arrangements that will limit costs work 
and reduce the risk of unexpectedly high mitigation costs (Victor 2001; Aldy et al. 2003). 
However, there is currently no consensus regarding what kind of mechanism is best suited to 
limit costs. Options include intensity targets (emissions targets which are defined relative to 
GDP) and a “safety valve” in emissions trading. The latter is an arrangement where the 
government will automatically issue more emission permits and sell them at a certain price if 
the market price for permits exceeds that level (this type of arrangement is also referred to as 
price cap or hybrid system). An emissions tax would also avoid risks of unexpectedly 
expensive regulation, but the political stigma attached to taxes will probably stand in the way 
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of pure tax solutions. In practice, a pure tax policy may also be more difficult to harmonize 
through international agreements.  
A second possible way to circumvent the cost barrier focuses on reducing the costs for 
specific, politically important sectors, which may in some cases conflict with overall cost-
effectiveness. For instance, a major source of CO2 emissions in the United States is coal-fired 
power plants. Coal is mined in more than half of the 50 U.S. states, and constitutes a labor-
intensive and therefore politically important sector (Fisher 2004). Even more states depend on 
coal-fired electricity for their industry and households. Government-sponsored projects to 
research, develop, and even subsidize investment in carbon capture and storage technologies 
may make climate policy measures more acceptable to the coal sector and its political 
defenders. On the other hand, U.S. agriculture may in fact earn from climate policy. Credits 
for carbon sequestration in agricultural soils and income from sale of raw materials for 
biofuels represent welcome additional sources for farmers. Proponents of more ambitious 
climate policies in the United States have sought to use these potentials to enlist support from 
senators and representatives from agricultural districts.  
2.3 Competitiveness concerns 
During the second half of the 1990s, the climate change negotiations were haunted by the 
following dilemma: The United States and the major developing countries could not agree on 
who should make the first move. In the United States, the Senate would not accept binding 
commitments unless the developing countries also committed themselves to emissions targets 
at the same time. The developing countries, on the other hand, insisted that the United States 
and other industrialized countries at the very least demonstrate their willingness to adopt and 
actually implement emissions targets in practice before they would even consider following 
suit.  
As we have seen in section 1, the George W. Bush administration does not encourage 
developing countries to adopt binding targets to reduce emissions and has come close to 
arguing against such commitments. This shift occurred because the unwillingness of both the 
U.S. President and Congress to adopt binding targets of any kind has rendered the question of 
who should move first obsolete.  
In case of a future policy shift toward U.S. reengagement in international cooperation on 
greenhouse gas controls, the dilemma is likely to reemerge. If the United States were to 
reengage in such negotiations, the competitiveness concerns underlying the Byrd-Hagel 
resolution would again become relevant. Economic competition from low-cost countries such 
as China, India and Mexico, and consequent loss of jobs in the U.S. are in fact enduring 
concerns that shape U.S. policy in several areas apart from climate change. The image of 
unfair competition from low-cost countries exempted from emissions targets was exploited to 
good effect by the anti-Kyoto industry lobby group Global Climate Coalition. These concerns 
are not likely to become less important in the near future. The relationship between the United 
States and growing Asian economies is a politically and emotionally charged issue.  
The political salience of competition issues can be seen in the 2002 decision by President 
Bush to place a protective tariff on steel imports to the United States. Equally, the heated 
debate on outsourcing of jobs overseas before the 2004 presidential elections illustrates this 
point. Traditional manufacturing and coal mining regions are key political battlegrounds, with 
states such as Ohio, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia seen as crucial to the outcome of 
presidential elections, and thus receiving much of the attention of political candidates and 
strategists.  
More generally, the climate change issue tends to be more systematically framed in 
economic and cost terms in the United States than in Europe, with a greater emphasis both on 
formal cost-benefit analysis and on cost and competitiveness arguments in general (Bang 
2003; Brewer 2003; Schreurs 2004). This framing of course highlights the drawbacks of 
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shouldering a burden without competitors doing the same, while an ethical or risk framing 
might give a different take on the issue. Analyses suggest that public support for 
environmental protection measures in the United States is generally strong, but vulnerable to 
cost arguments (Davis and Wurth 2003). In the post-9/11 era, concern about supposedly 
unfair competition from developing countries is underlined by the linking of economic 
strength and national security. The prospect of being bound by an agreement which may limit 
the strength of the United States – economically, if not militarily – may be another line of 
attack for opponents of future international commitments.  
2.4 Political system 
Through its “checks and balances”, the U.S. political system is explicitly designed to avoid 
excessive concentration of power. Balance is provided by a strict separation of powers 
between the executive, legislative and judiciary branches of government, as well as power 
sharing between the federal and state governments. The system offers a multitude of 
opportunities for resourceful stakeholders, including businesses, to influence policy. These 
characteristics of the U.S. political system have profoundly shaped international climate 
policy to date – and may be expected to do so in the future.  
First and foremost, the U.S. constitution specifies that a 2/3 majority in Senate must ratify 
an international agreement before the United States can become a party to it. The fate of the 
Kyoto Protocol, where the Clinton administration negotiated and signed an agreement with 
other countries while the Senate blocked ratification, is by no means unique. Since President 
Wilson’s League of Nations after World War I (the United States itself never became a party), 
this story has repeated itself many times. The President can not force the Senate to ratify a 
treaty. Conversely, the Senate can not force the president to negotiate and sign a treaty.  
Second, mandates and budgets for domestic policy programs must pass both houses of 
Congress, and may be vetoed by the President unless they have a qualified majority in 
Congress. The risk of “policy gridlock” – the blocking of new policy initiatives even where 
there is fairly widespread support for policy change but disagreement over the specifics – is 
endemic to the U.S. political system. This is particularly true whenever different parties are in 
control of Congress and the presidency, or when there are different majorities in the two 
houses of Congress.  
Third, the U.S. system offers particularly good access to policy processes for resourceful 
actors such as organized business interests. U.S. environmental groups are also fairly strong 
and have similar opportunities, but they are unable to compete with major business sectors in 
terms of resources such as money or manpower. Apart from the multiple access points offered 
by the complex political system, politicians’ reliance on private campaign funding is a major 
source of influence for business interests (Busby and Ochs 2004).   
All of this means, first, that it is a considerable challenge for pro-environmental interests to 
navigate any ambitious policy proposal through the U.S. political system. Second, it means 
that the United States has a problem of credible commitment internationally: Negotiating 
partners do not know whether the United States will in the end ratify an agreement, and it 
may take a long time until they find out (Busby and Ochs 2004).5  
5 These traits are by no means unique to the United States. The EU member countries may for instance 
have similar problems in agreeing to commit the EU. The protracted ratification process of the Kyoto 
Protocol in Russia provides another example.  
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3 Elements of a strategy for European governments 
To sum up the situation facing governments seeking to extend and improve the climate 
regime: The United States will not ratify the Kyoto Protocol. Under President George W. 
Bush, the United States is unlikely to reengage in negotiations on future commitments under 
the UNFCCC, as evidenced by its unflinching stance at the recent tenth Conference of the 
Parties to the UNFCCC (COP10) in Buenos Aires. Under the current administration, the most 
promising area for international cooperation is therefore technology research, development 
and demonstration. Meanwhile, there are important processes taking place in Congress, 
industry and several states (see also section 1.2. above).  
The climate policy initiatives launched by several states are particularly interesting. Over 
time, these may lead to increased pressure for a more proactive, unified national climate 
policy, even from emissions-intensive industries, which may come to prefer a more 
predictable and consistent regulatory environment to state-by-state solutions. Support for 
mandatory greenhouse gas controls has become considerable in Congress. However there is 
no majority for such a policy at present, and the recent elections were a setback for the 
proponents of such regulation. Over the next few years, that situation could change. Elections 
will largely determine the outcomes, along with the perceived public demand for a more 
ambitious climate policy, which may influence the positions of individual officials. Key dates 
are the mid-term Congress elections in 2006 and the 2008 elections for president and 
Congress. In the private sector the common front against regulation of greenhouse gases has 
been softened and positions have become more differentiated over several years. These 
developments in industry positions will not cause a policy shift in and of themselves, but may 
help make such a shift feasible under a different political leadership.   
In the current situation, European governments hoping to eventually reengage the U.S. in 
negotiations on future commitments may do two things to realize that goal: They may use the 
limited means available to influence the U.S. government’s position, and they may seek to lay 
the foundations for a climate regime the United States could be willing to join whenever the 
political situation changes. In pursuing those twin goals, Europeans and others will need to 
confront six important challenges.  
First of all, they must ensure a successful implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, including 
well-functioning systems for emissions trading. This will provide a useful argument for U.S. 
proponents of similar regulations. If, on the other hand, the Protocol and the emissions trading 
schemes are widely seen as failures, it would strengthen the hand of U.S. opponents of 
greenhouse gas regulations. 
Second, the Kyoto parties will have to deal with the issue of a second commitment period 
of the Kyoto Protocol to follow the first period 2008-2012, or alternatively some other 
arrangement to replace the Kyoto Protocol after 2012, without the U.S. government as an 
active or constructive participant in talks on this issue. The Protocol stipulates that 
discussions on a second commitment period should start in 2005. The Bush administration 
has previously made it clear that it does not expect to review its stance on climate policy until 
2012.  
Clearly, going further with an international climate regime without participation from the 
United States is an unsatisfactory solution. For one thing, the United States is responsible for 
a quarter of the world’s emissions and these will still be left unchecked. Furthermore, the 
emissions reduction targets for a regime that does not include the United States are likely to 
remain very modest. Concern about competitiveness toward the U.S. will severely limit the 
will to strengthen targets in other Annex 1 countries. Major developing countries are unlikely 
to accept any substantial commitments unless all the major developed countries are taking 
part in a joint global effort.  
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But given the policy of the current U.S. leadership, it is not clear that better alternatives 
exist. Postponing the issue of future commitments while waiting for the United States to 
change its mind – or designing a post-Kyoto agreement that requires U.S. participation to 
function – would mean waiting at least until 2009 before countries start negotiating 
commitments for the years after 2012. This would throw into doubt the future of the entire 
regulatory system currently being implemented, including the Kyoto Protocol’s targets and 
mechanisms and the EU emissions trading scheme. That is consequential because 
expectations regarding future regulations may in fact be more important to business 
investment decisions than the regulations actually in place at the time of the decision. 
Business actors’ assessments of the outlook for international climate policy will manifest 
themselves both in emissions permit prices and in long-term investments in energy 
technology. In other words, throwing the future of the existing regime and regulations into 
doubt may further undermine the already modest effects of these policies. 
In case it is not possible to make progress on the issue of post-2012 commitments in the 
Kyoto Protocol context, an alternative approach might be for the EU and like-minded 
countries to commit themselves strongly to post-2012 targets or policies either unilaterally or 
through an agreement between a smaller number of parties. Again, this is far from an ideal 
solution, but may be the best option available. If regulations of greenhouse gas emissions are 
to have any noticeable effect on long-term investments, it is crucial that the regulated 
businesses are not given reason to expect that the regulations may be removed in a few years.  
The third challenge is to help raise the profile of the climate change issue on the domestic 
U.S. agenda by those means available to foreign actors. Realistically, the main goal of 
European diplomatic efforts in the climate change field should not be to change the minds of 
their current U.S. negotiating partners, which represent the George W. Bush administration 
whose position seems entrenched. Rather, persistent challenges from European leaders help 
keep the climate change issue on the U.S. political agenda and in the media. This increases 
the attention paid to the issue, raises the political stakes somewhat, and thus helps those actors 
within the U.S. advocating a more proactive climate policy. 
In this regard it may be useful to consider experiences from the acid rain debate during the 
70s and 80s. Scandinavian efforts to make the UK and states on the continent of Europe 
accept responsibility for long-range transboundary pollutants acidifying Scandinavian lakes 
and streams had a North American parallel. The Canadian government participated actively in 
the U.S. debate on the same issue, both through formal diplomatic channels, scientific 
cooperation and through public statements and organized PR efforts. While domestic U.S. 
actors arguably played an even more important role, there is little doubt that the Canadians 
helped raise the profile of the issue.  
Similarly, today the emphasis European leaders such as Tony Blair and Gerhard Schroeder 
have repeatedly placed on climate change and the Kyoto Protocol in their comments on the 
Euro-American relationship help keep the issue warm in the United States. Blair’s pledge to 
place climate change high on the agenda of the G8 during Britain’s presidency of the group 
next year promises to keep the pressure on (Reuters news agency 2004). The IPCC process is 
another channel by which foreign climate change experts – and governments – are to some 
extent heard in the United States. For Norway and other states with interests in the Arctic, the 
Arctic Council where the United States is also among the members is one channel for 
engaging the United States in discussing the problem, as seen recently in the debates over the 
Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) process. 
For the time being, the results of such efforts will probably be indirect at best, in the form 
of increased attention to climate change issues in the United States, which may increase the 
political cost of non-action. This may eventually help convince a sufficient number of 
members of Congress, or their constituencies, that the problem is serious enough to justify 
mandatory regulation of greenhouse gases. Increased attention to the issue could even help 
bring about a situation where even the Republican presidential candidate in 2008 might 
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consider moving away from the Bush position on climate change. Foreign pressure alone will 
certainly not bring about any of these changes, but in conjunction with pressure from 
domestic actors it might exert considerable influence.  
Again, the acid rain parallel is instructive. After eight years of stinging attacks on President 
Reagan’s refusal to regulate SO2 both from environmental groups and scientists as well as the 
Canadians, Reagan’s vice president George H. W. Bush campaigned on a promise to regulate 
sulfur emissions in 1988. Bush Sr. was apparently seeking to distance himself from President 
Reagan and to build his own, more centrist platform. As president, George H. W. Bush 
followed up on his campaign promise, and Congress finally passed the Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1990, providing for a SO2 cap-and-trade system for the power sector. This 
policy was primarily a product of pressure from domestic actors, but the engagement of a 
foreign government with a legitimate interest in the matter may also have played a role. 
Fourth, it is important to maintain a dialogue between the Kyoto parties and those actors 
within the United States who are developing key climate policy initiatives in Congress and at 
the state level, with an eye to making policies converge on joint standards and principles. 
Such a dialogue is needed both between officials at different levels and between various 
nongovernmental actors. In particular, it is important to strive for some degree of 
harmonization in the design of emissions trading systems and the associated registries, 
tradable units, and reporting and verification protocols. This may eventually facilitate a 
linking of the various systems at some point. There is currently a discussion within the EU 
about linking the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) with the state-level and regional 
trading schemes being prepared in parts of the United States. (Buckens and Belin 2004:75; 
Kruger and Pizer 2004:12; Point Carbon 2004). This would probably require an amendment 
of the EU ETS directive. The background for the discussion on linking with U.S. trading 
systems is a strong wish in many European capitals to engage the U.S. international 
cooperation in this field and lay the groundwork for U.S. participation in a future climate 
agreement beyond the Kyoto Protocol. In this perspective, linking is indeed a meaningful 
strategy. However, key concerns for the EU with this strategy may be the consequences of 
such linkage for the scheme’s ability to help the EU and its member states fulfill their Kyoto 
commitments, and the future relationship between the EU ETS and International Emissions 
Trading (IET) under the Kyoto Protocol.6  
The Kyoto Protocol and the associated Marrakech Accords do not allow non-parties to 
participate in the three Kyoto Mechanisms, which are International Emissions Trading, CDM 
and Joint Implementation. Allowing credits or permits originating from a non-party into the 
system would require an amendment to the Protocol. There would be many problems and 
challenges associated with such a course of action, including how to ensure the environmental 
integrity of units from non-parties. However, if confronted with a persisting situation where 
countries such as the United States and Australia are not parties to the Protocol or any follow-
up agreement, but develop full-fledged cap-and-trade or project credit systems on a regional 
or even national basis, the Kyoto parties may be willing to consider the issue. It should also 
be noted that there is nothing in the Kyoto and Marrakech rules which would stop companies 
or other actors based in a non-party country from buying and keeping emissions permits or 
reduction credits from the Kyoto mechanisms (known as AAUs, CERs and ERUs). If the 
designers of a regional (or national) cap-and-trade system in the United States want to 
recognize Kyoto mechanism permits or credits, they are free to do so as far as the Kyoto rules 
6 In their current version, the rules for the EU scheme provides for the use of credits from the project-
based Kyoto mechanisms CDM and Joint Implementation to comply with the EU ETS requirements, 
but do not allow use of so-called “Assigned Amount Units” from International Emissions Trading 
under the Kyoto Protocol (Egenhofer and Fujiwara 2004; Kruger and Pizer 2004). While there are 
provisions for linking directly with other national emissions trading schemes in Annex B (developed) 
countries that have ratified the Protocol, there are no guidelines for linking with trading schemes in a 
country that has not ratified. 
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are concerned.7 Another matter is that there may be domestic legal concerns for state 
governments or private companies regarding the use of trading mechanisms set up by an 
international agreement to which the United States is not a party.  
The need for dialogue and efforts to make policy designs converge are not limited to 
emissions trading. The same goes for technical standards and other types of policies and 
measures (see below). 
Fifth, the Kyoto parties should consider in which climate-relevant fields other than actual 
emissions regulation they might usefully cooperate with the Americans on the short term. The 
obvious answer is science and technology. The knowledge and shared understanding built 
through cooperation in scientific research, monitoring and assessment of climate change is a 
crucial foundation for climate policy and should be given a high priority. As discussed in 
section 1 above, technology research, development and demonstration is the area of climate 
policy where the potential for cooperation with the United States currently looks best. Both 
the United States and European countries could usefully increase their efforts in this field. 
Given the discrepancy between projected energy supply and demand and what would be 
needed to keep global warming in check, governments worldwide spend remarkably little 
money on energy research and development. From the mid 1980s to the late 1990s – the very 
period that the global warming problem was taken up by political bodies – spending on 
energy R&D was in fact considerably reduced (Dooley et al. 1998; Dooley and Runci 1999). 
One proposed remedy is to negotiate a “R&D protocol” to the UNFCCC, where countries 
commit to specific levels of funding for collaborative research and development on cleaner 
energy technologies (Barret 2003). It is, however, not clear that such a formal agreement is 
necessary to promote R&D spending. Since just nine OECD countries account for 95 percent 
of the world’s investments in energy research and development (Dooley et al. 1998), 
negotiations involving all UN members may not be the most effective approach. 
A very simple and interesting proposal comes from Nigel Purvis, formerly a senior U.S. 
State Department official now at Resources for the Future. Purvis proposes that “Europe and 
Japan should challenge the United States to increase funding for international clean-energy 
research and development programs and for engaging major developing countries by pledging 
to match any new U.S. climate change expenditures (beyond what Bush has already 
announced) up to an additional $10 billion a year” (Purvis 2004). Increased government 
funding for climate-relevant R&D is a very useful long-term contribution to solving the 
problem, but cannot replace emissions control policies. While inviting the United States to a 
friendly competition on spending levels, Europe should also insist that emissions caps or 
similar incentives are necessary to motivate the private sector to invest in R&D, and to 
actually use existing emissions-reducing technology.  
An alternative type of incentive to stimulate innovation would be technology or 
performance standards for specific sectors or activities. Most likely, the current administration 
and congressional majority will be equally reluctant to enact such policies as binding overall 
emissions caps. However it might be worthwhile to consider challenging the United States to 
consider such alternative modes of cooperation. One useful area of cooperation might be 
international emissions standards for new automobiles, similar to those recently announced by 
California, or fuel economy standards similar to the federal U.S. CAFE standards (An and 
Sauer 2004). This is not the most cost-effective form of climate policy, but a clear benefit is 
that countries producing cars and trucks (including the United States) would have an incentive 
to participate in order to conform to and take part in defining the standards applying to major 
overseas markets (Barret 2003). Common policies to increase the relative shares that 
renewable or “CO2-free” sources represent in the total power generated might be another 
possibility. “Renewable Portfolio Standard” laws are already in place in several U.S. states, 
7 Thanks to Christina Voigt, Department of Public and International Law, University of Oslo, for useful 
comments regarding the legal aspects of linking different emissions trading systems. 
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policies similar to the “Green Certificates” schemes considered in Norway and other 
European countries (Menz 2004).  
Sixth, the Kyoto parties should reconsider their vision of the future international climate 
regime and how the United States might eventually reengage. One important debate centers 
on the nature of commitments. Right now is the time to consider carefully if different types of 
agreements than the Kyoto Protocol may be better suited for broad international cooperation – 
and for engaging the United States whenever an opportunity arrives (Aldy et al. 2003; 
Torvanger et al. 2004). Another interesting question pertains to the timing of domestic versus 
international climate policy processes. In the event of a future policy shift in the United 
States, it could be more important for European governments to push for domestic U.S. action 
to limit its greenhouse gas emissions, than to call for negotiations and international 
commitments immediately.  For several reasons it might be better both for the United States 
and its negotiating partners if the United States developed a credible domestic policy to 
control greenhouse gas emissions before it negotiates binding international commitments. For 
one thing, this may prevent unnecessary delays. Agreeing on and ratifying a new protocol 
under the UNFCCC will take a lot of time. So will guiding a credible plan to control 
greenhouse gases through the U.S. political system. The risk is that each of the two processes 
will experience prolonged breaks as it waits for the outcomes of other process. Starting with a 
domestic policy may also give negotiating partners a clearer picture of how ambitious targets 
are politically feasible for the United States. Furthermore, this strategy may help avoid a 
return to the hardened fronts between the United States and developing countries on who 
moves first. Negotiations under the auspices of the UN inevitably focus attention on issues of 
burden-sharing and fairness between countries. Making a voluntary, unilateral effort to avoid 
a global risk may seem less “unfair” to U.S. actors than entering a treaty that only commits 
some of the parties to action. Moreover, this may demonstrate the good will of the United 
States and restore trust between international negotiating partners. Starting by implementing 
policies to mitigate a global problem rather than by negotiating targets is by no means 
unheard of. One example would be the ozone issue, where substantial action to phase out 
CFCs by the United States and a handful of other countries came before the binding reduction 
targets in the Montreal Protocol (Benedick 2001). 
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